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The Review of the Russian Military Policy: Old Mythology, Today's Threats, Future Prospects

In the article it is reviewed the Russian military policy in the period of the years 2003-2004. It is tried to reveal the evolution of nature and the latter peculiarities of the military policy of Russian Federation (RF). There are presented quite a few instances of the Russian military policy's inconsequence as well as duplicity.

Due to the extent of the subject there are reviewed not all, but only the most important and for the Baltic region the biggest impact doing or being able to do aspects of the Russian military policy: the changes in the Russian military doctrine, the nature of the RF military reform, the role of the strategic nuclear forces and the tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy, the development of the military – industrial complex, the peculiarities of the military collaboration with other nations, regional structures of the regional and political – military blocs.

The most attention is given to the Russian military policy in the CIS space, to the Russian role in the Organisation of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and to the Russia-Belarus military collaboration, while analysing this phenomenon as one of the means of the RF military policy implementation. There is also briefly discussed the Russian military strategy of the latter years in the Baltic region.

Introduction

After collapse of Soviet Union and breakdown of the Warsaw military bloc Russia's military capability has noticeably decremented. The number of soldiers has decreased threefold, the amount of the main usual munition types – from 3 (aviation) to 10 (armour) times. Only the potential of the nuclear weapons remained approximate to the potential of the former Soviet Union. In the ninth decade Russia lost the position of the world power both from an economic viewpoint, and from a political and military viewpoint. The Russian armed forces within the latter decade having experienced a variety of transformations has entered the 21st century with a huge pressure of unresolved problems¹.

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¹ Rumer E. B., Wallander C. E., "Russia: Power in Weakness?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 2003–2004.

While dealing with the problems at global level in the beginning of the 21st century there has been settled the USA dominance, it began to develop apace the structure of the unipolar world. The present Russian economic potential, political influence and the military power didn't give it the opportunities to be an effective balance for the USA dominance in the world. The complicated situation of the armed forces (AF) and the military industrial complex (MIC) forced the Russian political and military elite to restrict its great-power ambitions.

However in the year 2000, Vladimir Putin having started to function as Russian Federation (RF) president has declared the word, that Russia must retrieve the status of the world-power and start to represent a clear role in the processes determining the global politics and economy. It was one of the main reasons, which helped him easily win the presidential elections. No sooner than he became the president, he started to implement his elective word in series. Since the year 2000 Russia started to change its foreign and military policy, to be in search of allies resisting to the USA dominance.

In the latter years it is made every effort to pass into the interval of the authoritative international political, political – military and economic frameworks, to expand the influence of the international organisations and to reform them to advantage of Russia².

Generally, in the years 2003 – 2004 there were particularly lots of far-reaching changes in the Russian military policy, which in the long-lasting perspective may have big influence both for the Baltic region, and on a global scale.

The understanding of the Russian national interests and the military threats became so broad, that, if there is a political will, practically there can at any time be found a formal pretext for the utilization of the RF armed forces in some nation's territory. Such a formal consolidation of the national interests and threats' perception in the main documents regulating the RF national security would cause not inconsiderable threat for the Russia's neighbour states, in between – for the Baltic States as well.

A noticeable alternation of the RF military policy conceptual attitudes shows, that the administration of the president Putin has evaluated the geopolitical changes having happened in the world, the military conflicts of late years and started to operate positively, having a clear long-term objective – to re-establish the former Russian power till the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to strengthen its geopolitical dominance.

Particularly big influence for the Russian military policy is making in the last few years noticeable rapid vertical militarization of the Russian military power, the prolonged war, which has reached an impasse in Chechnya, developing apace the influence of the president Putin and the officers loyal to him, the influence of the representatives of the special services in the Russian economy and other factors.

Lately a continually rising collaboration of the military and civil institutions, the interflow of interests and the infrastructure's utilization of the household nation for military purposes shows strong Russian intensions to strengthen apace its military power by all possible means and militarise the nation.

² Miller S. E. "Moscow's Military Power: Russia's Search for Security in an Age of Transition", *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.

Putin started to deal with the Russian AF problems having been gathered for a long time – finally it is realistically started to implement the optimisation of the RF armed forces and the appliance for the solution of new strategic goals. Since the year 2003 the new tendencies started to be developed in the military exercises operating in Russia: particularly big attention is paid to mobilization, the amount of exercise is constantly increasing (more and more often military exercises are synchronically implemented in several districts at the same time).

While using up the political authority being given by the available nuclear potential and being at the end of the increasing economy's resources, in the beginning of the 21st century Russia has made a lodgement in the group of the world-power called G-8, it is positively participating in the Russian – NATO council's activity, it attempts to get into the membership of the World Trade Organization, Islamic conference and other important international organizations.

The Russian leadership is constantly emphasizing for the West, that the present Russian foreign and military policy is clear, pragmatic and easily forecasted, but really it is still full of olden mythology, and future prospects of the Russian armed forces are quite vague, and this should cause some concern both for the Russian neighbour states, and for the global world-powers.

1. In Pursuit of the New Military Doctrine: between Ambitions and Opportunities

While planning and implementing its military policy Russia should follow the valid documents at conceptual level, most of which, including the RF military doctrine, were accepted in the year 2000. Though as far back as 2001 in September president Putin declared³, that, in connection with the enlarged threat of international terrorism, „the programme documents describing the main RF defensive politics's trends having been accepted earlier must be corrected substantially“. In the year 2003 in May president Putin in the report for the Federal Meeting⁴ formulated the provision, that „Russia must become a nation with up-to-date, well provided and mobile armed forces, ready to defend Russia, /.../ its national interests and citizens“. In the year 2003 initiated correction of the military policy's conceptual provisions shows a grave attitude of Putin and his inner circles towards the collected RF AF problems. It has been started to solve these problems substantially, that is – from the directive to legislative base's creation and development.

The main directive document, setting the trends of the present Russian military policy and activity, was published on the 2nd of October 2003 in the conference of the Russian AF leadership. Although the published document „The Relevant developmental goals of the Russian Federation armed forces“⁵ doesn't officially correspond to the requirements of the military doctrine according to its structure and level

³ ИНТЕРФАКС-АВН, Путин заявляет, что начался переход от разговоров о реформе армии к конкретной работе в этой сфере, 2001 11 12.

⁴ „Послание Федеральному Собранию Российской Федерации“, *Российская газета*, 2003 05 17.

⁵ Министерство обороны Российской Федерации, *Актуальные задачи развития вооруженных сил Российской Федерации*, Агентство „Военинформ“ МО РФ, 2003.

of approval, there was naturalized the title „The Broad Russian military doctrine“, given by the conferees and mass communication. By some of its provisions this document has shocked foreign politicians and reviewers. While delivering this „broad military doctrine“, Russia has officially refused the traditional concept of preventive detention and has chosen considerably more aggressive version of the military doctrine, in which there is a provided opportunity to arrange preventive strikes in any place in the world, if it is essential to defend RF national interests.

In the document „The Relevant developmental goals of the Russian Federation armed forces“ it is stated the attitude of the Russian military command towards the present situation of the armed forces and there are given developmental landmarks of the Russian Federation armed forces. It is stated, that the Russian military policy is being proportioned to/blended with new global realia, therefore, if these were changed, it is necessary to correct the attitude towards the state military policy and towards the armed forces as its realization tool.

Concerning the changes of the military policy in this document there is a presumption, that Russian intercourse with the USA and NATO states have come up to the higher level, therefore the possibility of a global nuclear war has been cancelled from the list of most probable conflicts. But there are many disagreements in this document – in the other point of the document it is stated, that „*still existing stereotypes of the cold war signally press international situation*“, big influence for the development of the global politics has an enlarged impact of economic factors, the interflow of internal and external terrorism and the rising influence of international structures, that Russia is positively following NATO transformation process and in case NATO will further remain the military alliance with the doctrine of offensive order, Russia will have to reconsider its military planning and developmental rules of the armed forces in principle as well as change its nuclear strategy. The latter statements should be treated as a warning or even a threat for NATO states (first of all – the USA).

The threats of war for the Russian security indicated „in the Broad doctrine“ are close to the threats indicated in the formal Russian Federation military doctrine, though new threats are being mentioned as well. These are actions, limiting Russia to have the use of strategically essential traffic communication, the violation of Russian civic rights and interests, the instability and weakness of the organs of government, being bordered on Russia. Despite the intercourse between Russia and NATO officially treated as good, there is still a threat of an expansion of the military blocs and alliances and of military blocs, breaking the settled balance of forces, deployment near the Russian borders.

The understanding of the Russian Federation national interests and the threats of war has recently become so broad, that, if there is a political will, practically there can at any time be found a formal pretext for the utilization of the Russian Federation armed forces in some state's territory. Such an official confirmation of understanding the national interests and threats in the main Russian Federation documents, regulating national security would cause some threat for the Russian neighbour states, in between – for the Baltic States as well.

While solving military conflicts in „the Broad military doctrine“ a big role is given to aviation, to a long-range and right pointing armament, to the action of connection and reconnaissance systems. When solving local conflicts the main tactical unit is going to be a battalion, and the main factor of up-to-date armed conflicts – a fight in the

air and outer space as well as afloat (the surface forces should only consolidate the results of the above-mentioned fight). The confirmation of the economic and political interests in the doctrine is named as the main reason, why today's conflicts can arise.

In the document there are also introduced new priorities vouching for the Russian national security and goals of the Russian Federation armed forces. When elaborating the goals the Russian national interests such as political, military, security and economic are emphasized. On purpose to vouch for the security of the Russian economic activity the armed forces can be used for the realization of vital economic and political interests of the Russian Federation if it is determined by the president. While implementing these tasks there can be also used such a deterrent as a combatant preparation of the nuclear potential and strategic deployment.

In this document the developmental priorities of the Russian armed forces are formulated following the geopolitical interests of the nation. There are indicated seven priorities, amid which the most important are the following: the potential retention of the strategic forces' detention, the expansion of the steady preparedness units and the formation of the military groups at their request. It is offered to pay the biggest attention to the present armament repair, to the maintenance of its military level and its extension of a term. For the modernization of the armament it is suggested to use the cumulative run-in of the armament build-up more effectively.

The potential retention of the strategic forces' detention in the doctrine is based on any kind of military enforcement for Russia and on the possibility to eliminate the aggression against it or its allies. According to the document, the Russian armed forces must be ready to demonstrate its military power and the possibility to use it. For that purpose serves "the measured utilization of the distinct strategic deterrent force components, their change of dislocation or arrangement of the military training". For the potential retention in the doctrine it is supposed to develop all the components of the strategic forces: the aboveground, the aviation (modernization of the strategic bombers TU-160), and the marine.

The consolidation of the steady preparedness units in the Russian military planning is not an innovation, but new is this, that one of its goals in the doctrine is being mentioned the demonstration of the military power on purpose to defend national interests. It is stated in the document, that these units must be created and expanded in all kinds of armed forces and in all types of troop, from which there can be formed various types of combinations or groups.

There it is also stated, that the military preparedness activity of the troop must be set to the real conditions at the maximum. One of the goals of the military preparedness is the readiness for the demonstration of military enforcement. It is supposed, that the main tactical unit when solving the tasks of local or borderline conflicts must be the battalion, every so often of a partial composition.

Apart from the above-mentioned points, "in the broad doctrine" there are also discussed the situation of the military cadre arrangement, the manning on a contractual basis and prospects, big attention is paid to the social and patriotic problems of the further armed forces development.

In the document it is also said, that the Russian armed forces are provided with the main types of armament, military technology and other material devices properly, though this statement should be considered as absolutely baseless, because

the situation of the ordnance and military technology of the Russian Federation armed forces is actually very complicated.

After the assassinations having happened in Russia in the year 2004, in August – September the national authority has made several statements, which could be also seen as the provisions at directive level.

In the year 2004, on the 1st of September, just before the hold of the hostages in the North Osetia, Ivanov declared, “there is a war in Russia, whose enemy is invisible, and there is no line”. The idea of the fight against terrorism taking place in Russia repeated president Putin in the year 2004, on the 4th of September addressing the nation and in the year 2004, on the 13th of September in the enlarged meeting of the government, in which he offered suggestions owing to the reform of the government structure on purpose to strengthen the fight against terrorism.

In the year 2004, on the 8th of September the head of general staff Gen. Col. Baluyevsky declared, that Russia could fetch preventive strikes for terrorist bases. “We will take to every kind of actions in order to eliminate terrorist bases in any region of the world. But it does not mean, that we will fetch nuclear strikes”, - said the head of staff. The possibility of preventive strikes for several times has also approved the Russian Federation minister of defence Ivanov. This was particularly emphasized in the meeting of NATO and Russian military office/department leaders in Romania in the year 2004, on the 14th of October in the announcement read by Ivanov.

In the year 2004, on the 29th of September the secretary of Russian Security Council Ivanov declared⁶, that by order of the president there will be formulated the new Russian Federation national security conception, because “in the 21st century Russia is facing new threats, requiring a detailed analysis”. In the year 2004, on the 28th of October the deputy of the Russian Federation Security Council Valentin Sobolev concretized this announcement: “the conception of the Russian national security must be essentially revised and it is needed to create a strategy for terrorism resistance”⁷.

It seems likely that in the year 2005 there would be well renewed all the main documents, regulating the Russian Federation national security and military policy. There will be officially consolidated a new understanding of military threats and goals of the Russian Federation armed forces, which at the end of the year 2003 was initiated to formulate “in the broad Russian military doctrine”.

It should be pointed out, that one of the main goals of the biggest military trainings⁸, having been proceeded in the Russian Federation armed forces in 2004 is to check in practice the operation of the main provisions of the new (yet unofficial) Russian Federation military doctrine and the operation of the new RF AF usage plan⁹ of the Russian Federation armed forces¹⁰. Therefore, after having analysed the biggest military trainings happened in Russia in the year 2004, it is true to say that one

⁶ Агентство Бизнес Новостей, Владимир Путин дал поручение подготовить новую редакцию Концепции национальной безопасности страны, 2002 10 29, <http://www.kadis.ru/daily/dayjust.phtml?id=3623>.

⁷ RIA Novosti, Концепция национальной безопасности РФ требует коренной переработки в связи с угрозой терроризма - замсекретаря СБ РФ, 2004 10 28, <http://www.aneews.ru/archive/2514062.html>

⁸ February 2004 – “Bezopasnost-2004“, April 2004 – large scale trainings of strategic aviation, June 2004 – “Mobilnost-2004“, August 2004 – “Sojuznaja bezopasnost-2004“ etc.

⁹ The new RF AF usage plan should be presented to RF President until the end of 2004. This document should come into power from 1st January 2005.

¹⁰ Порошков Н., “Время “Ч” в стране “Р”, *Время новостей*, 2004 06 29, с. 4.

of the biggest and most realistic threats for Russia's security, like in the Soviet Union times, is believed to be the threat from the West.

Moreover, the Russian military authority in the training period is calculating not only on defensive, but also on offensive actions, it pays a particularly big attention to the strategic forces mobility, to the arrangement of a mobilized reserve, and its main trump is reckoned the tactical nuclear weapon and strategic forces.

2. The Militarization of the Russian Political Power's Vertical: the Impact for the Russian Military Policy

The rapid militarization of the Russian political power's vertical in the last few years has also been making big influence on Russian military policy. At present every fourth member of the Russian political elite is an officer¹¹.

From the structures of power there has come not only the Russian Federation president Putin, but also his closest and most influential assistants V. Ivanov, I. Setchin, Vladislav Surkov.

Particularly lots of important posts were offered for soldiers in the ministries, which guide the economy and household activity, in the Russian Federation embassies abroad¹². It is noted that the especially important posts in Russia hold people from the Foreign reconnaissance post¹³.

A special structure of the federal power, created in the period of Putin's presidency is an institution of the president's plenipotentiaries in federal counties. Every plenipotentiary from seven counties has from 6 to 10 assistants; moreover, there lead about 150 federal inspectors and their assistants. While establishing this institution the priorities¹⁴ of Putin's cadre politics have best shown up.

Public attention is usually not paid to such appointments, but realistically these people can make big impact for the civil institutions' activity. A part of the great officers of power in Russia is the soldiers of the operative reserve that is they also serve at once in some kind of a paramilitary structure, they get earnings, and to the civil structure they are temporary drafted in to accomplish some specific tasks. One of the most typical features of the soldiers' ring, setting in all the most important spheres of the states government, is an implicit obedience and pursuance of orders, while suppressing the initiative and a different from the authority's opinion¹⁵.

The prolonged and having reached an impasse war in Chechnya is also of big importance for the Russian militarization. The soldiers present the combatant actions running in the North Caucasus as an additional argument, requiring to enlarge the sponsorship of the Russian Federation armed forces and provide them with the space-age armament and military technology, to solve the soldiers' social problems as quickly as possible.

¹¹ Here and thereafter all the present and former officers of the RF AF, Federal Security Service (FSB), Internal troops and other military and paramilitary structures are called as officers.

¹² Former RF Ambassador to Lithuania J. Zubakov formerly was a high rank official in the RF Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Currently he is a deputy of the RF Security Council secretary I. Ivanov.

¹³ Крыштановская О., "Элита в погонах", *Время-МН*, 2002 09 18.

¹⁴ Five plenipotentiaries of RF President in Federal districts are generals. 70 percent of their deputies are also high rank officers. Between inspectors about 35 percent of personal are officers.

¹⁵ Staar R., *Siloviki inside*, Hoover Institution of Stanford University, 2003.

Under cover of the increased threat of terrorism, authority of the special service and their influence on the domestic living processes are being expanded, under the influence of Putin in National Duma in the Russian Federation the laws, limiting civic rights and liberties are being legislated, the sponsorship of the Russian Federation armed forces and other force structures is being increased apace.

Besides, the influence of President Putin, the soldiers loyal to him and the representatives of the special service is being strengthened quickly not only in the Russian politics, but also in the economy¹⁶. In the year 2004, at the beginning of September one more assistant of the president's Putin head's of administration Surkov was elected as a chairman¹⁷ of the Board of directors in the public company "Transnefteprodukt"¹⁸.

Currently Kremlin is already able to control directly all the biggest national natural monopolies, the basic pipelines and gas lines, the military-industrial complex enterprises and other important objects¹⁹ for the national economy.

From all these enterprises controlled by Putin's administration there are received particularly lots of financial resources, which are also used for the realization of the Russian geopolitical goals, for the intensification of the Russian Federation armed forces' service and the further Putin's and his close people influence's consolidation in the nation.

3. The Military Reform: the Beginning of Serious Changes?

In the latter years the Russian authority is paying particularly big attention to the military reform. A successful realization of the armed forces reform is closely related to the gathering and arrangement of the military staff, to the development of the armed forces structure, to financial and social welfare of the soldiers, to the successful activity of the Military-Industrial Complex and to other problems.

It is noted that since the year 1999 Russian expenses for the national defence has been on the rapid increase. Only during the last 3 years the sponsorship of the Russian Federation armed forces has increased twice. In the year 2005 for the Russian Federation national defence it was supposed to budget 529,1 billion RUR (about 53 billion LTL), this is even 110 billion RUR more than it was budgeted in the year 2004. Besides, in the latter years not only the sponsorship of the Russian Federation armed forces has been on the rapid increase, but also the sponsorship of the other power structures. From the year 2000 to 2004 the sponsorship of the Russian federal Security Council has increased thrice, the sponsorship of the Home Office – two and a half time, the sponsorship of the borderline service – twice²⁰. Due to the particular-

¹⁶ Mydans S., "Putin Extends Power in Parliament", *New York Times*, 30 December 2003, p. A-7.

¹⁷ Current position is very important because lets directly regulate flows of oil export and to use this instrument as a tool for the implementation of geopolitical purposes.

¹⁸ Чайка Ф., "Сурков и нефть", *Известия*, 2004 08 25.

¹⁹ Deputy chief of RF President's administration I. Setchin this year was appointed as a chairman of the Board of directors in the Rosneft company. Chief of RF President's administration Dmitry Medvedev already several years is heading Gazprom's Board of directors. Moreover, assistant of president Putin I. Shuvalov is member in the Board of directors of the company Russian railways. Former chief of RF President's administration Alexander Voloshin is heading Board of directors of the company Yedinnaya energeticheskaya sistema (RAO JES) etc.

²⁰ Лантратов К., "Мирный бюджет военного времени", *Коммерсант*, 2004 11 24.

ly high global oil prices, a similar tendency should remain in the future as well. The rising sponsorship conditions the markedly increased Russian Federation's military activity, the annually rising number and extent of military trainings.

Particular attention of the Russian Federation armed forces is recently being paid to the forces expansion of the constant state of preparedness and to the rise of the state of preparedness. In the measurement of the new Russian Federation armed forces it is supposed to form military groups on the ground of the constant preparedness units in all the main strategic spheres, which without an extra mobilization could immediately carry out combatant tasks. Considering the particularity and the tasks of the military trainings having happened in Russia in the last few years, we can suppose, that Russia regards strategic trends of the West and the Far East as underlying.

Namely in these trends there is projected the potential possibility of the armed forces utilization in the large-scale military conflicts. China and NATO are unofficially regarded as the potential sources of threats.

Big attention is paid to the Central Asia (the South), though, considering the fact, that there are available not large-scale, but local (regional) conflicts, another tactics is used - basic attention is paid to the close military collaboration with the neighbour states, to these states' consolidation of the military potential, to the establishment of the regional security system, serving Russia's interests.

Since the year 2003 it has been finally started to implement the optimization of the Russian Federation armed forces and the appliance for the solution of new strategic tasks. New is this, that in this process there are increasingly involved all the main national power structures, and since the year 2004 – also the civil subjects (especially visibly it was manifested in the year 2004, on June during the military trainings „Mobilnost-2004“, when for the downthrown of the military units there were used airliners²¹ of civil aviation). Besides, since the year 2003 the new tendencies started to be developed in the military exercises operating in Russia: particularly big attention has been paid to mobilization, the extent of training has been constantly increasing (more and more often military exercises were synchronically implemented in some districts).

The rising collaboration of the military and civil institutions, the interflow of interests and the infrastructure's utilization of the household nation for military purposes shows strong Russian intensions to strengthen apace its military power by all possible means and militarise the nation²².

Russia, considering a new conception of the military threats is trying to reform all the administrative – military state machinery and its armed forces as soon as possible. One of the essential requirements is the Russian Federation armed forces' strategic mobility and flexibility, vouching for the operative redeployment of the military units and the possibilities of the combatant utilization, and the modern ammunition of big accuracy introduction to the armament. If the global oil prices remained high for at least 10 years (this is quite probable), Russia would most likely succeed in implementing²³ this goal.

²¹ Цыганок А., Плугатарев И., “Тактическая путаница в оперативно-стратегических умах”, *Независимое военное обозрение*, 2004 07 08, с. 1,7.

²² One of the latter examples how the country's civilian infrastructure could be used for military purposes – military radar of the RF's Baltic Fleet deployed on the oil extraction platform D-6 in the Baltic Sea (Lukoil company).

²³ Bendersky Y., “Russian military technology fights back”, *Asia Times*, July 2004.

The realization of the Russian Federation armed forces reform in Russia for a long time has been converged to a solution²⁴ of the problems such as the armed forces reduction of staff, on the ground of a gathering contract, the soldiers' pay increase and the development of social welfare. But all this is only a partial solution of the big problem, affecting the most numerous part of the armed forces – the land-force. The actual armed forces' problems such as the armed forces, the army's, their structure's and reciprocity's development, essential rearmament and redistribution of functions were actually not being solved. The reform in a broad sense (all the national military infrastructures, including KPK, military education and training and other fields) has not actually even been started²⁵.

It looks like Putin, who was for the second time elected as Russian president, has finally decided to start solving the prolonged problems of the Russian armed forces in principle. In the year 2004, on the 21st of April he declared, that decisions of the reconstruction of the Russian power structures' leadership should be accepted in the near future.

In the year 2004, at the end of March Russian Federation president Putin was resolved to displace the head of the Russian Federation general staff, Gen. Anatoly Kvashnin and to reorganize some Russia Federation power structures. The biggest impact for this decision had a constant Kvashnin's confrontation with the Russian Federation minister of defence Ivanov and the reform²⁶ of the Russian Federation armed forces, keeping still from the dead-point.

The repeated Ivanov's appointment as the Russian Federation minister of defence in a government, newly formed after the presidential elections in spring, in the year 2004 shows, that Putin firmly supports the politics, carried out by the minister of defence Ivanov.

Actually, since the year 2003 all the control of the Russian Federation armed forces has already been taken over by the minister of defence Ivanov. Namely Ivanov generally used to be near Russian Federation president Putin during all the most important military exercises in the year 2003, in 2003 on October he introduced "the broad Russian military doctrine", issued the main statements related to the Russian Federation armed forces and so on. Meanwhile since the end of the year 2003 the head of the Russian Federation General staff Kvashnin could not be seen in publicity – the RF General staff in various events has usually represented his assistant Gen. Col. Baluyevsky.

In the year 2004, on the 29th of April the RF National Duma gave its countenance to Putin's proposed amendment to the laws, by which the status of the RF armed forces General staff was lowered and its possibilities to influence the Russian military policy were restricted. The RF minister of defence Ivanov for the first time mentioned the necessity to review the RF General staff's functions in the year 2004, in January, while giving a speech in the meeting of the RF military academy.

When the reform has left the function of the military planning and combatant rule/control for the General staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, the head of the staff has lost the possibility to communicate directly with RF President and has

²⁴ Lopata R., Laurinavičius Č., "Karinė reforma Rusijoje: politinės trajektorijos", *Politologija*, 2001/3 (23).

²⁵ Barany Z., *Defence Reform, Russian Style: Obstacles, Options and Opposition*, University of Texas, 2004.

²⁶ Baev P. K., "The Trajectory of the Russian Military: Downsizing, Degeneration, and Defeat" in *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.

become directly subject to the RF minister of defence. It was incapacitated from the head of the General staff of the Russian Federation armed forces to arrange and launch directive documents, which till now were obligatory to all RF armed forces²⁷.

Gen. Col. Baluyevsky, who was the prime assistant of the head of RF General Staff, was appointed the new head of the RF General staff in the year 2004 in July, characterized as being more “mild” and being more inclined to pursue without reservation the decisions of the Russian political leadership.

By these changes it was supposed to solve the prolonged and quite problematic intercourse²⁸ between the Russian Federation Board of defence and the armed forces of General staff. It is intended that the new head of the Russian Federation General staff will immediately start to pursue a real, but not a “paper” reform of the Russian Federation armed forces and solve the old problems of the Russian Federation armed forces. However, being aware of the actual extent of these problems, it is hard to expect some prompt and cardinal changes.

4. The Importance of the Strategic Forces and the Nuclear Tactical Weapon in the Russian Federation Military Policy

The traditional attitude, dominating in Russian society and political sectors, that the strategic nuclear forces are the guarantee of the national security and the status of the world power, in the last decade has not practically varied.

On the ground of the data of various surveys of Russian inhabitants, the overall majority (70-80 percent) of Russians are convinced, that nuclear weapon is a determinant for the guarantee²⁹ of national security. Meanwhile in the Russian Federation military-political sectors in the latter years there was a violent battle due to the status of the strategic nuclear forces and the importance for the national defence. This fight due to the destiny and developmental prospects of the Russian Federation strategic nuclear forces in the Russian political-military sectors started to appear quite outright since the end of the year 1999.

In the period of the cold war and right after the disintegration of the Soviet Union strategic forces were regarded as the main guarantee and pride of the Russian national security. In the year 2000, on the 12th of July in the board meeting of the Russian Federation ministry of defence the then head of the Russian Federation General staff Kvashnin subjected a reformation plan of the missile army on a strategic purpose (SPRK), in which there was projected a considerable reduction in this kind of armed forces. Consequently, the then minister of defence Sergejev flatly resisted this plan of the head of General staff Kvashnin. He has treated the proposal of Kvashnin to reform the missile army on a strategic purpose as “*an attempt to destroy the missile army on a strategic purpose (SPRK), as an offence against Russia and a folly, endangering the Russian national security*”.

²⁷ Одноколенко О., “Генеральное сражение”, *Итоги*, 2004 08 09.

²⁸ Main S. J., *Couch for the MoD or the CGS? The Russian Ministry of Defence & the General Staff 2001-2004*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, April 2004.

²⁹ Gottmoeller R., “Nuclear Weapons in Current Russian Policy” in *The Russian Military: Power and Policy*, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004.

But in the year 2001 (SPRK) the dismissal of the General-in-Chief five-star general Vladimir Jakovlev and the appointment of the general colonel Nikolaj Solovcov as a leader of the missile army on a strategic purpose and the SPRK, as a kind of armed forces, reorganization into the army type, that is, the reduction of the SPRK status, practically meant the victory of Kvashnin in the fight, lasting for one and a half year, with the then Russian Federation minister of defence Sergejev due to the prospects of the strategic forces' development.

Since the middle of the year 2001 in the Russian military policy and planning processes the attitudes of the head of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General staff Kvashnin has started to appear, that the nuclear weapon first of all is a mean of a political impact and it probably will never be used, therefore, while financing the national armed forces, priority should be given to conventional, but not to strategic forces.

At the end of the year 2001 RF SPRK leadership declared, that till the year 2006 the Russian Federation's missile army on a strategic purpose is planned to be reduced third – approximately to 500 launching ramps, as well as to reduce twice the number of combinations.

In the latter years there have also been some major disagreements among the Russian military-political leadership due to the fact, that for which component's of the Russian Federation strategic forces (above-ground, naval or air) development should be given a priority. In the year 2002, 65 percent of the Russian nuclear arsenal was given to the missile army on a strategic purpose, 35 percent – for the watercraft (naval), 5 percent – for the military air forces. In the year 2002, at the beginning of January the assistant of the head of the Russian Federation General staff Gen. Col. Baluyevsky officially declared, that *“while developing the Russian strategic nuclear forces, priority will be given to the watercraft (naval) component of these forces”*. At the beginning of the year 2002 president Putin also spoke in support of this position of the General staff quite enthusiastically.

But already in the year 2002, at the end of March the minister of defence Ivanov, having visited the division of the Russian Federation missile army on a strategic purpose, being disposed in the region of Vypolzov (Tver district), where there were disposed mobile and stationary rocket complexes „Topol“, declared, that in the Russian armed forces there should remain a balanced triad of strategic nuclear forces, that is, the nuclear forces must be equally allocated overland, on the sea and outside.

Some months later, in the year 2002, on the 19th of June in the president Putin's meeting, assigned to the problem of sponsorship for the Russian armed forces reform, with the head of the Armed forces General staff Gen. Kvashnin and the Russian Federation minister of defence Ivanov, president suddenly announced, that priority should be given not to the watercraft, but to the surface strategic component's, that is SPRK, development.

It seems likely, that for such Putin's decision big influence has made the former Russian Federation minister of defence, the opponent of Kvashnin, Sergeyev, who became president's adviser in problems of the strategic military planning. On the threshold of the PRG treaty in the year 1972 of the USA retreat (at the end of May in the year 2002) he proposed to the president Putin an analytic note, in which he offered to review the plans of the strategic nuclear forces' development and considerably increase the sponsorship of SPRK. Sergejev managed to convince Putin, that

the retention and development of the strategic nuclear forces' potential for Russia currently is the cheapest and the most effective, and maybe even the only possibility to vouch for the national security.

In consequence, the situation and the attitude of the Russian Federation military-political leadership to strategic forces and its developmental prospects essentially changed in the middle of the year 2002. In the year 2002, on the 13th of June after the USA officially retreated from the treaty of antimissile defence in 1972, the Russian military-political leadership decided to review the developmental strategy of the Russian Federation nuclear forces and its basic attention pay to the development of the missile army on a strategic purpose. It was decided from the year 2003 to considerably increase the sponsorship of the Russian Federation strategic nuclear forces and to speed up the installation of the strategic nuclear rocket complexes "Topol-M". It was also decided to prolong once again the exploitation term of the ballistic missile complexes with resolving heads, among these the heavy ballistic missiles RS-20 (according to NATO classification – "Satan") for 10-15 years, despite the fact, that according to the former SPRK head Gen. Col. Yakovlev, the guarantee terms of these rockets' exploitation has already been earlier prolonged from 10 to 23 years, and after the year 2007 the exploitation of these rockets can be especially dangerous.

The changed provisions of the national political-military leadership with regard to the strategic nuclear forces reflect as well in the broad Russian military doctrine, introduced in the year 2003, on the 2nd of October. Among the indicated Russian Federation armed forces' developmental priorities the retention and development of the Russian strategic deterrent forces' potential is pointed out as one of the most important. It is based on the necessity to prevent any kind of military-political enforcement on Russia or potential aggression against it and its allies.

At the end of the year 2003 the Russian Federation minister of defence Ivanov once again vouched for the fact, that the original "renaissance" of the Russian Federation strategic forces, dating from the middle of the year 2002 and in the year 2003 having got an acceleration, will last in future as well. Ivanov, visiting Tatishchev in the year 2003, on the 21st of December, where the combatant watch has begun one more rocket regiment on a strategic purpose, provided with the newest rocket complexes "Topol-M", declared, that only the nuclear weapon which Russia has can vouch for and guarantee the national security and sovereignty. According to the minister, the leadership is lately paying more and more attention to the qualitative development of the strategic nuclear forces.

The main support of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is the intercontinental ballistic mobile basing rockets „Topol-M“. Three solid fuel engines, assembled in these rockets enable to develop a higher than other rockets speed, and some tens of vernier rockets make its trajectory of flight practically unpredictable for the enemies. The rearmament programme of the SPRK units and combinations with the „Topol-M“ rockets till the year 2010 was formulated and ratified in the year 2000. The first regiment armed with the „Topol-M“ rockets its combatant watch began in the year 1998, in Tatishchev's division situated in Saratov's region.

The complexes of mobile basing „Topol-M“ are still being tested (the experimental rocket shots were carried out in the year 2000 in September, in the year 2003 in June and in the year 2004 on the 20th of April). The serial production of these

complexes and the introduction into the armament can already be initiated in the year 2005.

Besides, in the year 2003 in December it was announced, that Russia begin to create a new intercontinental ballistic rocket on a strategic purpose, which will be able to carry up to 10 nuclear payloads. In the year 2004 the operations of the rocket's oil-fuel build-up had to be launched. By courtesy of this fuel the rocket should carry a load, which can weigh up to 4 tons, and this would outweigh the possibilities of the rocket „Topol-M“, using the solid fuel, more than three times. In the most optimal estimations, these rockets in the combatant watch can be started to use from the year 2009, when the operation of the Treaty of the strategic offensive armament (SGA-1) will come to an end.

Particularly great concern raises the fact, that lately in the Russian military policy not only the strategic, but also the tactical nuclear armament is of bigger and bigger importance. The Russian military-political leadership since the year 1999 (after Putin became the actual Russian Federation head) is constantly emphasizing, that the weakness of the conventional Russian Federation forces must compensate not only the strategic, but also the tactical nuclear weapon (TBG), that Russia will never be able to resist the organization like NATO³⁰ only with conventional armament. In the year 2001 in the Western press there appeared some messages, that Russia disposed its tactical nuclear weapon also in the Kaliningrad region, situated near Lithuania.

The status of the tactical nuclear weapon, indeterminate by any international treaties, the absence of its accounting and control devices enables Russia to retain its military superiority in a westerly direction without offending officially the valid treaty of the Conventional armed forces in Europe.

5. Changes in the Russian Federation Military-Industrial Complex

Despite the fact, being stated “in the broad military doctrine”, that the Russian armed forces “are provided with the basic armament types, military etchnology and other material tools at proper level”, the activity of the Russian Federation military-industrial complex (KPK) is of especially great concern to the Russian leadership. The armed forces' equipment with a new armament and military technology is the most burning problem of the Russian military policy and development. The constant attempts to change the complex's structure of leadership, the proprietary forms of enterprises shows, that the Russian military and political leadership can not find an optimal version, enabling to vouch for a successful proceeding of this important sector of military and economic politics.

Various facts suggest that the Russian military-industrial complex consists of from 1200 to 1700³¹ enterprises, for quite a big part of it the military produce is not the basic. Though the majority of these enterprises, especially the small ones, are economically hardly surviving, but there are about twenty enterprises, which output

³⁰ Jasutis G., Sadauskas K., “Rusijos karinė doktrina: konvencinės ir branduolinės ginkluotės santykis”, *Politologija*, 2002/1 (25).

³¹ Бабакин А., “Отечественная оборонка производит массовый брак”, *Независимое военное обозрение*, № 24, 2004 07 02, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2004-07-02/1_abroad.html

in the year 2003 was from 3 to 22 billion roubles³² (from 100 to 730 million USD). The main income of these and other economically stronger enterprises were gained from the armament's export.

A high-powered organization of the Russian politics and military experts – Foreign and Defence Council of politics in the report, prepared at the end of the year 2003, states, that the situation in the Russian military-industrial complex (KPK) is much worse, than in the armed forces, and namely this critical situation of the military-industrial complex, if no prompt developmental measures were taken, will influence the decrement of the Russian military power in the near future.

An inefficient proceeding of the military-industrial complex enterprises in the year 1993-2001 lead up to bankrupt of about 500 KPK enterprises. Their produce became waste/unnecessary or it did not suit the quality or price requirements. The main reason of this situation is low extents of the national defensive orders, allocated to enterprises, its total absence or the production on loan, because only the minority of enterprises was and is able to produce the output, saleable to export. New armament is almost not being served to the Russian armed forces. For instance, while the Russian military-industrial complex produces per year about 50-60 planes, one or two watercraft, about hundred tanks for export, then for the Russian armed forces for the year 2004 it is planned to buy 6 ballistic rockets, one strategic bomb dropper, 14 tanks, 5 pursuit planes and 1 helicopter³³, to modernize 5 pursuit planes named Su-27.

These data partially contrast with the revenue allocated to the national defensive order – in the year 2004 it was budgeted for 148 billion roubles. While measuring, that the prime cost of producing one pursuit plane costs to Russia 300-500 million roubles, and the strategic bomb dropper – about 1,5 billion, in the year 2004 Russia could have produced 300-450 pursuit planes or about 100 strategic bomb droppers. To some purpose the president Putin in September officially required the minister of defence Ivanov to explain, where on a Russian scale very big resources allocated to the defensive order disappear. According to all details, the funds are used ineffectively, distributing among a big number of enterprises and many orders of scientific research, planning and construction, from which only a little part is introduced into manufacture. The possibility is not being discounted, that quite a fair part of funds is peculated illegally.

On purpose to make the proceeding of the enterprises of the military-industrial complex, the vast majority of which belong to the nation, more effective, the Russian political and military leadership takes administrative measures – tries to optimize the complex's structure, arranges perspective programmes of the Russian armed forces armament and the qualitative development of the armament.

The main programme, in accordance with which there currently is the Russian armed forces armament/equipment, is “the National armament programme 2001-2010”, ratified in the year 2001, on the 27th of June. Another programme, in accordance with which in parallel with the above-mentioned there is being proceeded product manufacture and the in hand modernization of the perspective armament and military engineering/technology, is a federal-objective programme called “The

³² Хазбиев А., “Военно-промышленный комплекс”, *Эксперт*, № 37, 2004 10 04.

³³ “Кому принадлежит Россия. Военно-промышленный комплекс”, *Коммерсант-власть*, 2004 05 24.

reformation and development of the military-industrial complex 2002-2006", into which already in summer of the year 2004, the leadership already being under the guidance of the new premier Fradkov, the changes were introduced.

The proceeding of the 2001-2010 armament programme's realization is being responded critically: the leaderships of the armed forces and armament types and units are constantly laying claim to insufficient amounts of the supplied armament and its inadequate quality, to the disruption of the provision terms. The former chairman of the National Duma committee of defence Nikolajev in the year 2003, on the 13th of October declared, that "the development of the programme is disrupted by all rates. Even if for the sponsorship of the programme there were annually be given about 250 – 300 billion roubles, whereas it is twice more than it is planned for the year 2004, its completion date would be postponed for the year 2013 – 2014".

The head of the armed forces' headquarters of armament the assistant of the minister of defence the army's Gen. Moskovsky in the year 2004 in August also critically responded to the realization of the programme.

While measuring the unsuccessful realization of the armament programme for the year 2001-2010, in autumn of the year 2002 the programme of the Russian armed forces' armament for the year 2006-2015 was started to be framed. In the year 2003 in February its outline were being discussed in the Russian Federation Security Council. According to Putin, the main advantage of the new programme is that it is fairly "aggressive", because it provides for the armament build-up of really new quality, the pursuit of the informative precedence in the intended fight.

While arranging this programme there is followed a provision, that an appropriate balance between demands of armament and economic national opportunities must be sustained. As the president's adviser on the defensive and KPK questions Alexander Burutin³⁴ states, currently for the national defence it is given 2,5% - 2,8% BVP, though according to the valid armament's programme there should be allocated up to 3,5%. In his estimation, alongside with the minimal allowable level of the present sponsorship extents it is managed to sustain the combatant armed forces' potential only by courtesy of the national economy's increase, and only after having reached the intended 3,5% BVP sponsorship it is allowed to speak about the optimal armed forces' provision with armament and weaponry. But for this already since the year 2006 it is necessary to start supplying the army the examples of the new, in a serial way issued, modern armament. Though, the new programme will probably be ratified only in spring³⁵ of the year 2005 and its influence will start to come into play not earlier than in the year 2007.

This programme also reflects the present armament politics' provision of the armed forces, being dictated by the limited Russian economic opportunities. In accordance with this provision till the time, when the armed forces will start getting the modern weaponry, it is necessary to pay the main attention to the keeping of the in hand combatant level of the armament, its repair and the roll-over of exploitation and, depending on the possibilities, modernization.

³⁴ Коротченко И., "Проблемы реализации военно-технической политики России", *Военно-промышленный курьер*, № 32, 2004 08 25.

³⁵ Авдеев Ю., "Мы вновь удивили мир", *Красная звезда*, 2004 07 23.

On purpose to revitalize the overall proceeding of the military-industrial complex and to increase its effectiveness, since the year 2001 the reform of the complex's structure is being pursued. For its realization in January of the year 2001 "the plan of the Russian Federation military-industrial complex's reform for the year 2001-2005" was confirmed. The main objectives of this plan – the simplification and optimisation of the military-industrial complex's structure, the connection of the military-industrial complex's enterprises to the holding companies according to the type of the launched produce, in one structure connecting the organizations of scientific research, planning-construction and manufacture, as well as the reduction in dubbing of the enterprises proceeding.

Due to the provisions and realization opportunities of this plan incisive discussions were carried out in the military-political Russian leadership and, while correcting and supplementing the plan of the year 2001-2005, the federal-objective programme "the Reformation and development of the military-industrial complex in the period of the year 2002-2006" was formulated. In accordance with this programme there was projected a much bigger KPK structures' centralization into holdings, their more strict jurisdiction to the armament agencies³⁶, created in the year 1999.

But the creation of holdings is hardly in progress. When in the year 2001 it was projected to establish 74 holdings, in the year 2002 their planned number was reduced to 42, so in the year 2004 it is already planned to create only 29 holdings (till October of the year 2004 there were created 5). Sometimes the creation of holdings both economically, and technically falsifies. For example, one of the first holdings – PLG tools' planning and production holding "Almaz-Antey", being created for more than a year, according to expert opinion, did not come up to expectations. Besides, in autumn of the year 2004 the news from Russian GM trickled out, that due to the infighting of into the holdings connecting enterprises, distinct proprietary forms and the juridical base's deficiency the creation of holdings can be absolutely rejected¹⁸. In that case, the shake-up programme of the military-industrial complex for the year 2002-2006 should be once again corrected.

To correct the developmental programmes of the military-industrial complex can fall to the Russian political and military leadership also due to the deteriorative quality of the armament and weaponry, being produced in Russia. The problem of the weaponry's quality comes into play in two aspects:

1. the possibility of the military-industrial complex to produce the items, meeting the highest tactical-technical requirements – the so-called fourth and especially fifth generation's armament, is on the is diminishing;

2. the armament, produced in Russia (and mostly exported) and the weaponry are out of keeping with its declared technical characteristics in line with the possibilities of mass, speed, accurateness, remote control and cosmic connection, with the resistance to radioelectronic interferences and other parameters, but the major inadequacy, worrying the customers/clients is the reduction in reliability of the armament and weaponry.

³⁶ In 2004 Russia's military-industrial complex consisted from 5 armament agencies: cosmic armament agency "Rosaviakosmos", military ships building agency "Rossudostrojenije", agency of automated armament control systems RASU, agency of conventional armament RAV and the munitions agency "Rosbojepripasy".

The effect of the first aspect is slightly perceptible yet and the enterprises of the military-industrial complex find foreign clients, buying the armament, being manufactured still using the SSSR worked power. But in the last few years the symptoms have come into play, that on purpose to supply proper produce to the armament's market, the Russian KPK enterprises are already forced to use the products of foreign firms, especially from the field of radioelectronics, connection and computer technologies, optics (their substitutes produced in Russia usually do not meet the requirements or they are very expensive). This tendency will develop in future.

The problems of already manufactured produce quality, having shown up in the last 3-5 years, are of much greater concern for the Russian military leadership. They are particularly coming into play in the cases, when the leadership of the armed forces, having no means by which it could change the obsolescent armament, prolongs its exploitation's term. The leaders of the army types and units are complaining about the low quality of the armament and engineering, due to low quality it is not managed to successfully launch ballistic rockets, to hit the mark under the night circumstances or for the rescue workers to fasten to the „drowned“ training submarine, but the worst is, when low quality becomes the reason³⁷ of the catastrophes with human victims.

The enterprises of the military-industrial complex get many reclamations due to low quality of produce both from foreign clients, and from their own armed forces. During the last 3 years the number of reclamations, received from the Russian armed forces, increased 10 times, and the reclamations, received from foreign clients – 20 times³⁸.

Another facts suggest that in the year 2002 the number of reclamations, received from foreign clients was 622, in the year 2003 – 861; in the year 2004 there were more than 500 statements due to the elimination³⁹ of the disadvantages, indicated in the reclamations.

The India pretensions to the quality⁴⁰ of the pursuit planes Su-30MKI, the deck basing pursuit planes MiG-29K, assigned to the cruiser-carrier „Admiral Gorskikh“ can example the foreigners' dissatisfaction with the produce quality of the Russian military-industrial complex, Malaysia makes a bid for Russia due to the quality of the serial planes such as SU and MiG.

It is already getting hard for Russia to achieve the intended quality of the military-industrial complex's products and of the armament of its armed forces. As an instance of this there can be creation of the strategic ballistic rocket of solid fuel, named „Bulava“, allocated to the watercraft. The prototype of „Bulava“ called „Bark“ was started to create still in SSSR times, though its all three shoots of development types were unsuccessful. Instead of it, the other designed organization began to create „Bulava“, though it is not finished yet and strategic submarines will get them at best at the end of the year 2005⁴¹.

³⁷ According to official declarations – main reason of most aviation catastrophes in RF AF is human factor. Anyway, other sources claims that the real reason – unsatisfactory condition of military technique (especially helicopters).

³⁸ Бабакин А., „Отечественная оборонка производит массовый брак“, *Независимое военное обозрение*, № 24, 2004 07 02.

³⁹ „Бракованная техника подрывает национальную безопасность“, *Независимое военное обозрение*, № 29, 2004 08 06.

⁴⁰ Бабаева С., Литовкин Д., „Индия отказалась от российских истребителей“, *Известия*, 2003 12 16.

⁴¹ Литовкин В., „Булава идет макетом“, *Московские новости*, № 39, 2004 10 15.

The main reason of the deteriorative products' quality is a moral and physical run-out of the industrial-technological base of the Russian military-industrial complex. After the SSSR breakdown, the enterprises of the complex, attempting only to survive and neglecting prospects, the main implements of production, machine-tool plant, laboratory and mount equipment, the elemental base of manufacture were practically not renovated, the up-to-date materials were not being created and used. Even the plant facilities, being in the first flight and working for export, is worn out up to 80 %. The chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Defence and security committee Ozerov defines the situation in the enterprises of the military-industrial complex as an oncoming technologic stagnation⁴² and requires to take immediate action for its betterment.

Another important reasons for the quality's deterioration of the military-industrial complex produce – little extents of the issued produce (the Russian armed forces almost does not order it, and the extents of export are inconsiderable) and lack of experienced cadres (the best specialists grew old or moved to private structures, new specialists are not being prepared/qualified and do not apply due to relatively low salaries, restriction of work privacy and lost image of placement in the enterprises of the military-industrial complex).

The Russian political and military leadership pays quite big attention⁴³ to the armed forces provision with weaponry and military engineering, to the armament quality's problems, though a more considerable improvement does not show up. The solicitude for the armament's quality also shows the arrangement of the armament programmes, the expansion of the order of national defence, which has become constant in the latter years, overtaking common expenses for defence.

It is displayed in the following table:

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005*
Common expenses for defence, billion roubles	191,7	246,7	264,2	345,7	441,5	531,1
Increase, %		28,7	15,2	21,6	19,0	29,1
Expenses for the national order of defence, billion roubles	46	57	79	111	136	188
Increase, %		24,1	38,6	29,3	23,4	37,5

Findings/data are from the Russian federal draft budget for the year 2005.

The structural changes of the military-industrial complex, reorganizations, shake-ups, etc. constantly being in progress, also do not benefit both for common proceeding of the complex, and for its producible weaponry's quality. It is also responded in the negative to the national government reform, being pursued since March of the year 2004, when the guiding of the military-industrial complex activity was given to the Federal industrial agency⁴⁴, but not to the ministry of Defence.

⁴² Озеров В., "Российский оборонный экспорт: состояние, проблемы, перспективы", *Военный парад*, 2004 июль-август.

⁴³ Starting from 2001 problems of the quality of military technique and armament were discussed at various governmental and nongovernmental institutions (see note 15).

⁴⁴ Николский А., "После начала административной реформы проблем стало больше", *Ведомости*, 2004 07 07.

One of the potential decisions when improving the proceeding of the military-industrial complex can be offered the reconstruction of the SSSR times' structure – the ministry of industrial Defence. Such opportunity has been mentioned in the mass media for about a year, though the chairman of the Russian Federation Council of Defence and security committee Ozerov⁴⁵ has suggested it most seriously. However, while implementing this idea the problems of the national and private property being in the jurisdiction of the ministry should be met, some disagreements of a juridical nature and technical difficulties of the changeover would be on the rise, and the essential improvement of the military-industrial complex proceeding would hardly be ensured.

6. The Trajectories of the Military Policy: Companions and Enemies

The main provisions of the Russian military policy markedly influence the Russian intercourse with the main world powers or their blocs.

The Russian military collaboration with the West and NATO has lately strongly developed (it came into play at the end of the year 2003 – at the beginning of the year 2004). Though, attention should be paid to the fact that this is in most cases only new tactics, conditioned by pragmatic interests, whose aim in a sustained perspective is to benefit from the politics and economy as much as possible, to obtain more power in international politics, to re-establish the image of Russia as a powerful nation without rejecting the long-lasting interests in the Baltic states, the East and Central Europe as well as in CIS countries. The implementation and vindication of these interests (on the ground of the new unofficial Russian Federation military doctrine, it can be also performed by military tools) is postponed for a later time.

Russia began to show particularly high initiative to develop a close collaboration with NATO in spring of the year 2004, right after the NATO expansion (it is an odd paradox, because the majority of the Russian politicians, soldiers and ordinary citizens treat the NATO organization as an opponent to Russia). This paradox is explainable with the opened NATO reform, debates about the future of this military bloc. Russia seeks to make a lodgement in the new NATO structure, to get an opportunity to influence the transformation of this organization to Russia's advantage and, last of all, to weaken it.

Thus the new strategy, formulated by Russia somewhere about 2002 in respect of NATO, is being implemented: to transform NATO from the military-defensive bloc into a more political organization, to dismember it from the inside.

One of the main and most important methods – the dismemberment of the Euro Atlantic combinations, the escalation of tension in the intercourse between USA and EU – it is being made when pursuing the creation policy of the strategic alliances both with USA, and with Germany and France (it is an odd double game).

Every effort is being made on purpose to reduce the NATO influence in the world, especially – in Europe. As an alternative for NATO, Russia is actively propagating in multilateral and bilateral meetings the creation of a united security system

⁴⁵ Озеров В., "Восстановление Миноборонпрома – востребованная идея", *Независимая газета*, 2004 09 20.

in Europe as a balance for the USA dominance. Lately Russia is especially actively propagating the idea of the European antimissile defence (PRG) system, which should be a balance for the antimissile defence system, being created by the USA. It would be beneficial for Russia not only politically, but also economically (the possibilities of weaponry and equipment export).

In the year 2004 the Russian intercourse with France and Germany has particularly improved. Without an economic France's and Germany's concernment to keep terms with Russia as a supplier of energy sources, the resistance of the USA invasion to Iraq in the year 2003 and a general provision to oppose to the USA dominance in the world politics became an inducement to the approach of these states. Germany and France together with Italy are actively maintaining the Russian positions in the negotiations with the European Union in the fields of trade, no-visa treatment, transit through the region Kaliningrad and other questions.

Russia keeps traditionally well relations with China and India. These two nations are the major partners of its economic and military-technical collaboration. Russia sells to China and India fighting planes, surface ships and submarines, PLG systems, armoured engineering, licences to manufacture tanks, arranges for these nations military specialists. However, being afraid of political competition and potential military contraposition, Russia refuses to sell for China bomb droppers of a strategic nature, up-to-date pursuit planes, PLG systems and other modern weaponry.

Lately it is of especially high importance for Russia to keep its influence in the Islamic countries of the world. Although Iraq and Afghanistan are not anymore in a direct Russian sphere of influence, Russia still has its economic and political interests in these countries and strives to defend them. When developing the military-technical collaboration, Russia strives not to release Syria, Algeria, the Sudan from its sphere of influence, extends its influence in Malaysia, Indonesia. Despite the fact that Iran indirectly maintains/supports the structures of international terrorism, Russia assists Iran to pursue the raising doubts programme of nuclear energy scheme, opposes to the USA requirements to deliberate this programme in the Security Council of the United Nations.

In the year 2004 it was actively started to renew the contacts of economic and military-technical collaboration with some former socialistic nations in the Southeast Asia, Latin-America and other regions of the world.

6.1. The Russian Military Policy in CIS Countries

Despite the particularly broad Russian geography of the military policy, one of the major Russian aims of late years is to keep in its sphere of influence the CIS countries.

In July of the year 2004 the Russian president Putin declared, that it is necessary to strengthen far more the integration of the CIS countries, to keep developing the organization of the Collective security agreement (KSSO), and that Russia has to play the major, leading role in this process⁴⁶. This announcement is regarded as clear Russia's ambitions to become a world-power, uniting the regional political, military and economic structures.

Another high Russian politician – the Russian Federation National Duma

⁴⁶ Третьяков В., "Летаргический сон СНГ", *Российская газета*, 2004 07 22.

chairman of the committee of Defence Gen. Col. Viktor Zavarzin declared in spring of the year 2004, that in order to vouch for the Russian Federation national security interests it is necessary to keep the Russian military power in various CIS regions, first of all in Georgia and Moldova. Thus, it is hardly probable that Russia attempts to eliminate situated there its military bases at an early or medium date as it is laid under obligation in the Istanbul conference. On the contrary, at the end of the year 2004 the realization and development of military bases in the CIS countries became one of the Russian military policy priorities and an effective measure of the influence's consolidation in these nations⁴⁷.

One of the newest Russia's initiatives are intensions to reform radically the European organization of security and collaboration (ESBO) and to change the security system, existing in Europe. An adequate announcement, initiated by Russia, in which it is urged on to review once again the principles and policies of the European organization of security and collaboration, was published by eight CIS countries in the year 2004, on the 3rd of July. The Russian Federation Foreign Office is framing an appeal to all the members of the European organization of security and collaboration, in which it will be urged on to undertake the organization's reform.

The reform of the European organization of security and collaboration (ESBO) is being sponsored by many CIS countries (all the members of the CIS Collective security agreement, the Ukraine and Moldova), which, same as Russia the European organization of security and collaboration has more than once bitter criticized for the lack of democracy and breach of human rights.

Besides, at the end of August of the year 2004, in Sochi, the Russian Federation president Putin talked to the leaders of Germany and France about the initiatory reform of the European organization of security and collaboration – they are also approvingly assessing the mentioned Russian initiative. It could be explained as Germany's and France's intention to reduce the USA influence on the European security system, to create an original European NATO analogue and close with Russia, consolidating its long-lasting supply of power resources⁴⁸.

Attention should be paid to the fact, that a decade ago this organization has already been radically reformed. Then existing the European conference of collaboration and security was reformed on Russia's initiative into the European organization of security and collaboration, which major functions had to be guarantee of security in Europe while cooperating with NATO and European Council. Then Russia also wanted to create a strong alternative for NATO – there was an intention to reduce the Alliance's significance to European security and so to suspend the expansion to the East. Though, being politically and economically weak, Russia did not manage to pursue this idea to the utmost. Currently the international and economic situation is markedly advantageous for Russia.

While initiating the new reform of the European organization of security and collaboration, Russia tends to reactivate the same “independent of the USA Europe-

⁴⁷ Мухин В., “Минобороны РФ усилит свое влияние в ближнем зарубежье”, *Независимая газета*, 2004 10 15.

⁴⁸ Russian oil export currently satisfies about 30 % of Germany's oil market demands. Russia's part in this market is constantly increasing.

an security system” idea. One of the major objectives of this idea is not to release from its sphere of influence the Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus nations and to suspend NATO expansion to these regions.

6.2. The Organization of the Collective Security Treaty

Some years ago, when in the former republics’ territories of the Soviet Union has shown up a military contingent of the West, Russia began to be actively in search of the balance’s possibilities for the rising USA influence in CIS expansion and potential NATO expansion to this region.

On the 27th of April in the year 2003 on the ground of the old CIS Collective security agreement was established a new military-political structure called the CIS organization of the Collective security agreement (KSSO). This organization consists of six CIS members: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia and Tadzhikistan. In December of the year 2003 the World Trade Organization registered the organization of the collective security agreement as an international regional organization. Same as in the NATO provisions, in the provisions of the organization of the collective security agreement there is a statement, that “one of the organization’s members attack will be treated as the attack of all the organizations’ members”.

In the year 2003, on the expiration of commissions the KSSO secretary-general Valery Nikolayenko, who has been in power for three terms of office, the new KSSO secretary-general was appointed Nikolay Bordiuzha⁴⁹. The latter appointment demonstrates Russia’s efforts to give the organization of the collective security agreement a special authority.

One of the major CIS KSSO components is the Common forces of rapid reaction in the Central Asia⁵⁰. It consists of four distinct battalions (1,5 thousand soldiers):

- Assault battalion „Kazbat“ – in Kazakhstan territory;
- Upland rifles battalion – in Kirghizia;
- Assault and landing battalion – in Tadzhikistan;
- Separate connection battalion from the Russian 201st motto rifles division, disposed in Tadzhikistan territory.

In the year 2003 the Common forces of rapid reaction were strengthened with the aviation bloc, which located in the Kant military base in Kirghizia. This is one of the steps towards the establishment of the collective security allied army’s bloc (regional forces) of the Central Asia’s region.

On the ground of the resolution of the CIS organization of the collective security agreement ministries of defence, the collective forces of prompt response will be expanded into almost 2,5 times in the year 2004. Alongside with the 4 present battalions and aviation group there will be connected 5 more battalions: by one from Russia, Kazakhstan and Kirghizia and two battalions from Tadzhikistan.

⁴⁹ N. Bordiuzha formerly acted as chief of RF federal boarder service, RF Security Council, RF President’s administration.

⁵⁰ 25th May 2001 by the decision of four countries of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) were created Common forces of rapid reaction.

Without the already existing Common forces of rapid reaction, Russia has offered to establish also the task-force in the organization's of collective security agreement frames, which are planned to use in an escalated situation in one of the CIS countries, belonging to the organization of collective security agreement: for the neutralization of terrorist organizations or blocs, for the fight against the drug traffic, the illegal armament traffic. These forces would have a separate leadership.

The Common forces of rapid reaction are designated to operate only in the Central Asia region, and the task force – with all the strategically essential aspects, interacting with other forces' structures. It is particularly relevant to Russia, because it will be able to use these military forces for the implementation of its foreign policy objectives as well.

Thus, the organization of the collective security agreement can be regarded as Russia's attempt to create something similar to the analogue of the Warsaw treaty in the CIS expansion, as a balance for the increasing USA and NATO influence in the Central Asia, the South Caucasus and other regions, which Russia traditionally regards as an area of its interests⁵¹.

6.3. The Russia-Belarus Regional Military Grouping in the Western Direction

Since the middle of the year 2003 it has been noted an especially marked intensity's increase of the bilateral Russian and Belarusian military collaboration and a rising activity of the Russian and Belarusian regional military bloc in a westerly direction. Namely Russia uses its biggest initiative on this point⁵².

The establishment of the Belarusian - Russian regional military bloc was projected already in the year 1997 in the creation treaty of the Russian and Belarusian allied nation.

The regional military bloc was established on purpose to secure the allied nation's security and the united defensive expansion, to be the deterrent factor of military threat in a north-westerly direction and it must begin to operate in case of threat or military conflict.

“The expansion of the military blocs, connected with an increase of the military groups and the consolidation near the allied nation's border” is regarded in the Russian and Belarusian Union's national security concept and in the military doctrine as one of the major factors of the military threat.

An accomplished NATO expansion and all its results are being treated unofficially by the leaderships of both nations as a direct military threat for the allied nation and in response to it the regional military bloc can be used for preventive actions. Yet there is no evidence, that this Russian and Belarusian leaderships' provision due to the threat, endangered by NATO, could change in future.

The Russian and Belarusian military collaboration has turned especially active and assumed new elements in the year 2003 – 2004. In the creation process of the united defensive system biggest attention was paid to the development, intensifica-

⁵¹ Поросков Н., “Солдаты без границ”, *Время новостей*, 2004 08 11.

⁵² Мазаева О., “Реверансы на военной почве”, *Независимая газета*, 2004 10 11.

tion and perfection of the state of preparedness of the regional military bloc, created three years ago. Besides, the working of the joint PLG system and the juridical base of the military collaboration were being developed. The agreement "Due to the reverse provision of the regional military bloc" was signed up, which was ratified by Russia in the middle of the year 2004. In purpose to keep the united training system of military specialists, the common programme "The Belarusian soldiers' training in the Russian military training institutions".

Currently the joint Russian and Belarusian system of air-defence (AAD) has already been created, its offensive function (aviation) has been strengthened, the deployment of the anti-aircraft rocket brigades closer to the western borders is being pursued, the interaction of the surface units belonging to the regional military bloc is being developed, the reverse provision system of the bloc is being created, the general programmes of weaponry's unification and modernisation are being pursued, the deployment of the especially modern Russian operational tactical rocket complexes called "Iskander" in Belarus is projected, general military trainings are being pursued, their extents are increasing, the consentaneous military reform is being pursued. There are being integrated the domestic troops of both nations Home Offices, the frontier troops, the railway troops and the internal security structures (KGB and FSB), etc.

The number of the joint Russian and Belarusian military trainings and the variety of the solving tasks has also enormously increased in the year 2003. In the year 2003 there were in total about 60 various joint Russian and Belarusian developmental practices of the state of preparedness. The priority was given to the general military air forces and the air-defence (as well as radio-electronic fight) forces' trainings and exercises. As an instance of the general air-defence (PLG) system it was also started to organize the proceeding of the regional military bloc (RKG), forming the land-forces units.

The number of the joint Russian and Belarusian developmental practices of the state of preparedness should increase in future even more, because at the end of the year 2003, in the joint board meeting of the Russian and Belarusian ministries of defence it was decided to strengthen the regional military bloc of two nations and the state of preparedness of the units, belonging to this bloc. The common military trainings of the regional military bloc will be pursued in future both in Russia's, and in Belarus territories.

At the end of the year 2003 there was signed up a joint programme of the Russian and Belarusian ministries of defence for the year 2004 and a concrete scenario, connected with the regional military bloc, in which it is forecasted, that there will be further pursued a material-technical supply of the combinations and units, belonging to the bloc, keeping the level of the state of preparedness of the common basing military airports, being situated in the Russian and Belarusian territory, a united connection system will be further created.

The Russian and Belarusian regional military grouping is being created and developed as a direct response to the NATO expansion (it went public more than once in the highest level), and pending this bloc's military trainings NATO forces are usually playing a role of a conditional opponent.

7. The Baltic Region – an Eternal Area of Russia's Interests?

It is not a secret, that a substantially increased Russian military, political and economical activity in the latter years is being noticed not only in the CIS countries, but also in the Baltic States and the Baltic region.

Since the middle of the year 2003 in the Russian press, in the announcements of the analysts and high-ranking politicians it was more than once emphasized, that currently, while the national armed forces are still conditionally weak, it is especially promising for Russia to increase its economic influence and thus, but not by military tools to strive for its political aims and keep influence on the new NATO member states.

The latter Russian tactics in the Baltic States characterizes best the statement of the Russian Federation National Duma vice-chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, which was announced right after the NATO and EU expansion in the middle of the year 2004: „in the South we are using military methods, and in the Baltic States there will be employed economic methods“.

Though the changes of late years in the major Russian national security documents, in the Russian Federation armed forces developmental programmes, the scenarios of the military trainings, taking part in the Western part of Russia, and the adequate statements of the Russian political and military leadership show that, in the long-lasting perspective „when there is a necessity to defend Russia's interests“ and when the Russian Federation armed forces are strengthened enough, in the Baltic States, same as in any other part of the world, there can be used not only economic, but also military methods.

Russia, in the latter decade having officially reduced the number of the armed forces in Kaliningrad region, since the year 2003 has rapidly optimised and strengthened its military bloc, situated in the Kaliningrad region.

Attention should be paid to the fact that in the year 2003 – 2004 the military activity of the Russian Federation Baltic watercraft, deployed in the RF Kaliningrad region, has substantially increased.

The increased role of the Russian Federation Baltic watercraft and the attention of the Russian Federation political-military leadership to it show, that in the year 2003 apart from the traditional military practices, taking part in spring and at the end of summer, there additionally were two large-scale inspections of the BL units, on June of the year 2003 there were large-scale joint trainings at a demonstrative nature with the Russian Federation North watercraft (the trainings were observed by the Russian Federation President Putin himself). The strategic-military significance of the Kaliningrad region shows also this, that for some time there have been inculcated the most advanced military technology and structural innovations in this region, bigger attention is paid to the contractual work.

It seems likely, that due to the increasing Russia's economic interests in the Baltic (new maritime lines, oil output), the activity and importance of the Russian Federation Baltic watercraft should increase even more in future.

In Conclusion

The Russian military policy of late years is closely related to the foreign and internal politics, being governed by the nation's leadership. There is an intention to transform the armed forces into an active implement of the Russian foreign politics, an effective measure of political enforcement/pressure. Lately the Russian president's Putin and his environment's objectives to increase the national economic and military power by all possible means, to create military and economically strong, influential nation in the world, to re-establish the former status of the world-power, to extend by all possible means its geopolitical influence in the surrounding regions, have especially come into play.

The first aspects of the Russian foreign and military policy, becoming aggressive, were noticed already in the year 2000, right after Putin was elected president. Basically, the majority of the Russian politicians and especially soldiers approve of the course, selected by the president. Despite the official doctrinal statements, that Russia does not treat other nations as opponents and does not feel any aggression from them, there are being noticed in the Russian military policy the clear tendencies of the consolidation of the military power, the aggressiveness of the foreign and military policy and the rising hostility for the West.

In the year 2003 – 2004 emerged the particularly influential circumstances for the aggressiveness of the further Russian foreign and military policy. The biggest influence for that due to the record high global oil prices has brought a beneficial Russia's financial situation. When a long-lasting positive financial perspective has come into play, when the Russian foreign debt and dependence on the Western financial support have substantially decreased, the Russian macro national ambitions' development got a certain impulse. The Russian Federation armed forces started to be rapidly developed and modernized, their sponsorship is on a substantial increase, the military activity is constantly rising, there is being pursued an intensive and purposeful implementation and development of the initiated new military-political and economic blocs.

Since the year 2003 the juridical base of the Russian Federation armed forces proceeding has been formulated and corrected especially actively, the new normative documents at conceptual level were being accepted. Particular attention started to be paid to the Russian Federation armed forces' reform, to the implementation of the armed forces and the national defensive order's sponsorship, the qualitative and quantitative extents of the military trainings started to increase apace.

It shows, that after the disruption of the Soviet Union, the prolonged degradation of the Russian Federation armed forces is overcome, that the military reform has finally moved from its dead-point and in the long-lasting perspective Russia can become a powerful nation not only economically, but also from the military point of view, being able to dictate its ground rules in international politics.

Due to the increased threat of terrorist acts the Russian society's approval to Putin's "strong hand's" politics has also markedly developed. Quite a fair part of Russians are currently determined to abandon some of their civic rights and freedom in the name of the promising security and stability in the state and they feel logically

hardly explainable hostility for the West. For the majority the main Russian geopolitical Putin's provisions, imperial ambitions, a sequential and pragmatic assertion of the national interests in all directions and an especially active and aggressive Russia's foreign and military policy is absolutely acceptable and understandable. The political opposition in Russia is weak and raven, and the reaction possibilities of the West to the dangerous processes taking part in Russia are also restricted: it is mostly conditioned by the threat to loose Russia's support for the Western anti-terrorist coalition and the West's (especially Europe's) dependence on the Russian power resources.